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Last updated 06.03.10
FREE SPEECH
Toledo's anti-panhandling law
American Booksellers Foundation, et al v. Strickland, et al
City of Lyndhurst v. Scott Silver
State of Ohio ex rel. Toledo Blade v. Court of Common Pleas of Henry
County, et al.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
ACLU v. DeWeese
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Planned Parenthood of Cinci v. Taft, (Restrictions on Use of
Mifepristone)
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Warshak v. United States
State of Ohio v. Antwaun Smith
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Hasan v. Ishee
City of Toledo v. Rost (Sex Offender Residency Restrictions (SB 5))
Adam Walsh Act (SB 10) Sex Offender Registration and Notification Cases
State v. Bodyke
State v. Nelson
In re D.S.
Chojnacki v. Cordray
HABEAS PETITION
Foust v. Hauk
BORDER DETENTIONS
Rahman v. Chertoff
DUE PROCESS
Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Paulson
State v. Maxwell White
John Doe v. Mary Ronan, Cincinnati Public Schools, and Ohio Department of
Education
State of Ohio v. Darryl Durr (Durr I)
Darryl Durr v Richard Cordray, et al. (Durr II)
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
Miller v. Wilkinson
PUBLIC RECORDS
State ex rel. Brian Bardwell v. Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners
State of Ohio ex rel. American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners et al.
LGBT RIGHTS
Cleveland Taxpayers for the Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland (challenge
to domestic partner registry)
Free Speech
Toledo's anti-panhandling law
FACTS: The City of Toledo has had,
for decades, a law prohibiting virtually any sort of solicitation
anywhere in the City unless it is (1) by a good deeds membership
organization, of its members, for the benefit of the organization, or
(2) done with a license, which may be obtained only on a showing that,
among other things, it is done on behalf of a good deeds organization,
that other solicitation for that organization is not occurring, and that
the solicitation will benefit the people of Toledo. Levaughn Harris
panhandles to make ends meet. He has been repeatedly prosecuted, and in
some cases incarcerated for doing so.
LEGAL THEORY: The law violates the First
Amendment. Panhandling is protected First Amendment activity and while
some regulation may be allowed, the sort of blanket prohibition the City
of Toledo has enacted violates decisions of the US Supreme Court going
back at least to 1940.
STATUS: On March 10th 2008 the Law
Director for the City of Toledo has directed the Chief of Police to stop
enforcing Toledo’s unconstitutional Solicitation Ordinance. The City
intends to revise the ordinance.
American Booksellers Foundation, et al v. Strickland, et al
FACTS: Ohio Revised Code 2907.3 (D) is the Ohio version of the Computer Decency Act and the Online Child Protection Act rolled into one, the two federal statutes which sought to regulate content on the internet and criminalize the online publication of “inappropriate” material.
LEGAL THEORY: Similar state laws restricting online content have been struck down in half-a-dozen other jurisdictions. Ohio Revised Code 2907.3(D), originating from House Bill 8, shares the same flaws as those state laws already invalidated: it is vague in its definition of what sort of content is prohibited; it is overbroad, in that it prohibits a wide variety of material from being displayed online, including material depicting cruelty and excessive violence, which would allow authorities to criminalize much of both pop culture and classical literature, and; it purports to regulate a wealth of online material that is produced and published out of state. The bill became effective May 6, 2002.
STATUS: Together with the Media Coalition, a broad coalition of publishers and media industry groups, we filed suit in federal district court in Dayton, in May 2002, seeking to enjoin the eighty-eight county prosecutors in Ohio from enforcing the provisions of House Bill 8. In June 2002, we filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction seeking to block enforcement of the new law pending the final resolution of the case. That motion was granted by the court as a temporary restraining order in late August and as a preliminary injunction in early September 2002, and the state-wide application of the ordinance was enjoined pending the final resolution of the case. The state appealed, and the General Assembly later amended substantial portion of the law in question. The case was remanded to district court, where an amended complaint contesting the amended law was filed in August 2003. Cross motions for summary judgment regarding the amended provisions of the revised code were filed in late September and Early October 2003. Responses to those motions were filed in December 2003. On Sept. 27, 2004, an opinion was issued granting in part, and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The defendants appealed and we cross-appealed. Briefing was completed in the Sixth Circuit on May 6, 2008. Plaintiffs submitted a copy of the decision in
ACLU v. Mukasey (Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision) to the Court on August 1, 2008 as relevant information. Oral Argument was held in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on 12/12/08. We await that decision. On March 19, 2009, the Sixth Circuit
sua sponte issued an order certifying a question regarding the interpretation of the statute to the Ohio Supreme Court. On April 22, 2009, we filed a Preliminary Memorandum in support of jurisdiction with the Ohio Supreme Court. On June 3, 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of two questions and ordered briefing. The State’s brief was filed July 10, 2009. Our reply brief was filed August 10, 2009. Oral argument was held on Tuesday, October 20, 2009. The Ohio Supreme Court issued a decision Jan. 27, 2010. In answering the certified questions, the Ohio Supreme Court narrowed the statute to limit its application to electronic communications where the sender can control who receives it and knows or has reason to know juveniles will receive the material. The Ohio Supreme Court’s answers to the certified questions were filed in 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on February 19, 2010. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered supplemental briefing by both parties, which was filed on April 7, 2010.
On April 15, 2010, the U.S. Sixth Circuit issued a decision accepting the Ohio Supreme Court’s limited construction which narrowed the reach of the statute, reversed the federal district court’s prior decision that found the statute unconstitutional (prior to the limiting construction), and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to vacate the prior injunction and enter judgment in favor of the state.
City of Lyndhurst v. Scott Silver
FACTS: Silver was issued a citation for making rude remarks and giving his middle finger
to a Lyndhurst police officer at a crime scene where Silver’s daughter had been the victim
of domestic assault. Silver used to own a business next door to the police department and
canceled a contract the former owner had with the department. Since then, he claims the
city police seem to find any excuse to roust him. In December 2009, Silver was awakened at
4:30am by a call from his older daughter that his younger daughter had her jaw broken by
her boyfriend. He told them to call the police and he was on his way. This is where the
stories diverge. Silver claims that at the scene, he talked with his daughters and at least one
officer. He tried to ask the sergeant a question, the sergeant refused to answer, Silver made
a disparaging remark, and the sergeant told him to leave. Silver walked to his car, got in,
and gave the middle finger to the sergeant. The sergeant pulled him out of his car, roughed
him up, and threatened to arrest him. The sergeant claims Silver was belligerent and asked
too many questions, interfering with police, and being rude and abusive, and so was
ultimately issued a citation for interfering with police.
The initial charge was for Disturbance, a fourth degree misdemeanor, and the ticket
specifically said it was for giving the finger to the sergeant. At the arraignment, the
prosecutor dismissed that charge and replaced it with Obstructing Official Business, a
second degree misdemeanor, with no overt mention of giving the finger to an officer.
LEGAL THEORY: The First Amendment provides that it is perfectly lawful to say rude
things, make rude gestures, and ask questions of police. “Obstructing official business”
requires that a person actually obstruct or prevent police from doing their job, which is not
the case as the boyfriend was successfully arrested for domestic assault.
STATUS: Silver was scheduled for a pretrial on January 11, 2010. We filed a motion for a
continuance, which was granted, pushing the pretrial 30 days later. We are currently in
discovery. A pretrial was scheduled for March 8, but a continuance was sought and granted
because Silver was out of town. A new pretrial is scheduled for April 12, 2010.
State of Ohio ex rel. Toledo Blade v. Court of Common Pleas of Henry
County, et al.
FACTS: Henry County Common Pleas Judge Muehlfeld is presiding over the cases of
Jayme Schwenkmeyer and David Knepley, who are both facing criminal charges in
relation to the death of Schwenkmeyer’s infant daughter. The trials were scheduled to be
held a week apart in February 2010. Attorneys for Knepley, who will be tried second,
requested Judge Muehlfeld impose a gag order on press coverage of Schwenkmeyer’s trial
because of concerns that media reports could taint potential jury members. The judge
granted the motion and issued a gag order. The courtroom would be open to the public, so
reporters may attend and take notes, but the press would be prohibited from reporting on
the first trial until a jury is seated in the second trial.
The Toledo Blade appealed the gag order to the intermediate appeals court and lost. On
January 27, 2010, the Blade filed a complaint in the Ohio Supreme Court for a writ of
prohibition or alternative writ barring the enforcement of the gag order and a motion for
expedited briefing.
LEGAL THEORY: The public has a constitutional right to attend criminal trials, and the
media have a constitutional right to have access to trials in order to report trial events to
the public. A trial court may not restrict public access to or reporting of a criminal trial
without first weighing other options that are less restrictive, such as a change of venue or
empanelling both juries at the same time. A gag order on public reporting of a criminal
trial is unconstitutional when other means, less restrictive on the First Amendment right of
free speech, are available to the court.
STATUS: On Thursday, January 28, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court granted an alternative writ staying the challenged order and then set expedited briefing on the merits of the case. The parties’ joint evidence was filed Feb. 17, 2010. The Blade’s merit brief and our amicus in support were filed March 1, 2010. Henry County’s brief is due March 22, and the Blade’s reply is due March 29, 2010. The Ohio Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition on April 13, 2010, finding that the gag order was unconstitutional.
Establishment Clause
ACLU v. DeWeese
FACTS: James DeWeese, a common pleas court judge in Mansfield (Richland County),
had a homemade poster of the 10 Commandments framed and on display on a wall of his
courtroom. We successfully sued him and eventually, it seems, he took it down. There is
now a new poster in the courtroom contrasting the 10 Commandments, described as “Moral Absolutes,” with “Moral Relatives: Humanist Precepts.” The poster offers this
analysis and perspective:
The cases passing through this courtroom demonstrate we are paying a high cost
in increased crime and other ills from moving from moral absolutism to moral
relativism since the middle of the 20th century. Our founders saw the necessity of
moral absolutes. President John Adams said, “We have no government armed
with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and
religion. Our Constitution was made for a moral and religious people. It is
wholly inadequate for the government of any other.” The Declaration of
Independence acknowledges God as Creator, Lawgiver, “Supreme Judge of the
World,” and the One who providentially superintends the affairs of men. Ohio’s
Constitution acknowledges Almighty God as the source of our freedom. I join the
founders in personally acknowledging the importance of Almighty God’s fixed
moral standards for restoring the moral fabric of this nation.
LEGAL THEORY: The old poster constituted an endorsement of religion in violation of the First Amendment. The new one does, too, and violates the underlying orders.
STATUS: We sued in federal court over the first poster, asserting that it was an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion. The court agreed and ordered DeWeese to remove the poster. He
appealed the decision to the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision by
2-1 vote in July 2004. DeWeese appealed to the Supreme Court which refused to hear the case.
On May 29, 2008, we filed in the Northern District federal court a motion to show cause why
DeWeese should not be held in contempt for hanging the second poster. On June 11, 2008,
DeWeese renewed his Motion for judicial disqualification of Judge O’Malley, who presided over
the prior case. Also on June 11, DeWeese filed his response to our motion. On August 6, 2008
the request for judicial disqualification was denied. On August 8, 2008, our motion to show
cause why DeWeese should not be held in contempt was denied on the basis that it was not the
same poster. We filed a new complaint on October 7, 2008, and the case was assigned to Judge
Gaughn. On November 13, 2008, we filed a motion asking to reassign the case to Judge
O’Malley. On November 14, 2008, DeWeese filed a motion in opposition to our motion to
reassign. On the same day, our motion for reassignment was denied. A Case Management
Conference was held on December 12, 2008, to schedule discovery and dispositive motion
deadlines. A Status Conference was held on May 18, 2009. Dispositive motions are due on or
before July 1, 2009. Our motion for summary judgment was filed on June 5, 2009. The state’s
brief in opposition was filed July 3, and our reply was filed July 20, 2009. On
October 8, 2009, the District Court granted our motion for summary judgment on all claims and found that the
latest display violates the First Amendment. On October 9, 2009, DeWeese filed a notice of
appeal and a motion for stay pending appeal. The motion for stay pending appeal was fully
briefed, and the District Court denied the motion on November 4, 2009. The appeal was
docketed in the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. The 6th Circuit’s required telephone mediation
conference was held November, 19, 2009. DeWeese’s appeal brief was filed December 17, 2009.
Our brief was filed January 19, 2010. DeWeese’s reply brief was filed February 5, 2010.
The
case is fully briefed, and the 6th Circuit will schedule a date for oral argument.
Reproductive
Rights
Planned Parenthood of Cinci v. Taft (Restrictions on Use of Mifepristone)
FACTS: Ohio’s HB 126 was passed into law in June 2004 and became effective on September 23, 2004. The law regulates and restricts the use of mifepristone, an abortion-inducing medication.
LEGAL THEORY: Our suit argues that the law is unconstitutionally vague; that the law will violate women’s right to bodily integrity; that the law is unconstitutional because it lacks an exception to its restrictions where necessary to protect women’s life or health; and that the law imposes an undue burden on women’s right to choose abortion.
STATUS: The lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction on behalf of three Planned Parenthood
affiliates in Ohio and Preterm (in Cleveland), was filed on August 2, 2004. On September 22,
2004, U.S. District Court Judge Susan Dlott issued a preliminary injunction preventing the law
from going into effect, as it otherwise would have the next day. In October 22, 2004, defendants
filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit with respect to the District
Court’s order granting the preliminary injunction. Oral argument took place on December 7,
2005. On February 24, 2006, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part the District
Court’s ruling, and remanded it back to that court for further proceedings. This decision applied
only to the scope of the injunction by the District Court and had nothing to do with the merits of
the case.
On April 20, 2006, we filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction
or, in the Alternative, Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support
Thereof. On September 27, 2006, the Court granted our Motion for Summary Judgment and
Permanent Injunction. Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal to the Sixth Circuit on October
26, 2006. The issue of attorneys’ fees is currently before the District Court. On February 22,
2007, Governor Strickland was removed as a Defendant in the lawsuit after he filed a brief on
February 20, 2007 asking for such, citing his lack of opposition to the use of mifepristone that
HB 126 seeks to restrict. Oral Argument was held on April 23 2008, in Cincinnati in the Sixth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue is whether the trial court correctly granted the “Motion
for Summary Judgment.”
On June 23, 2008 the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order of certification
to Supreme Court of Ohio to address Ohio state law questions regarding off-label use of mifepristone in O.R.C. 2919.123. On July 15, 2008, the Ohio Attorney General filed
memorandum in support of Ohio Supreme Court answering the certified questions. On
September 10, 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to answer the certified questions asked by
the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Attorney General’s brief was filed in the Ohio
Supreme Court (where the case is called Rogers v. Planned Parenthood of Cincinnati Region) on
October 20, 2008. Our brief was filed November 19, 2008. Oral argument in the Ohio Supreme
Court occurred on Tuesday, March 10, 2009. The Ohio Supreme Court issued an opinion on the
meaning of the Ohio statute on July 1, 2009, and sent the answers back to the U.S. Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
On August 6, 2009, the Sixth Circuit issued an order remanding the case back to the
District Court for rehearing in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit
vacated the 2006 permanent injunction but left the 2004 preliminary injunction in effect.
The case is back in the Southern District. A status conference was held December 8,
2009. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment are due by March 15, responses due by April
15, and replies due May 17, 2010.
Fourth Amendment
Search and Seizure
Warshak v. United States
FACTS: Pursuant to a federal investigation of a company owned by Steven Warshak, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and FBI sought and secured numerous orders under the Stored Communications Act. Those orders led to the federal government obtaining numerous e-mails of Warshak’s from several ISPs.
LEGAL THEORY: The Stored Communications Act violates the Fourth Amendment by allowing seizure of certain e-mails without probable cause and a warrant and the SCA was applied wrongly with respect to Warshak.
STATUS: Warshak filed a civil case in federal court. On July 21, 2006, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio enjoined the United States, pending final
judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, from seizing, pursuant to court order, the
contents of any personal email account maintained by an Internet Service Provider in the
name of any resident of the Southern District of Ohio without providing the relevant
account holder or subscriber prior notice and an opportunity to be heard on any
complaint, motion, or other pleading seeking issuance of such an order. The government
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Our amicus brief was filed on
November 27, 2006. Oral argument occured on April 18, 2007. On June 18, 2007, the
Sixth Circuit largely affirmed the District Court’s July 21, 2006 ruling. On August 2,
2007, the government filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc. We joined an amicus brief
in opposition to an en banc review that was filed on September 5, 2007. An Order was
filed on October 19, 2007 granting the Petition for En Banc Hearing. Oral argument was
held on December 5, 2007. On March 5, 2008 there was an Order Lifting Stay of
proceedings pursuant to the verdict entered in the criminal matter. A status conference
was held on May 15, 2008. On July 11, 2008, the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled en banc, vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding the case to the District
Court to be , because the constitutional claim was not ripe. On September 19, 2008, the
District Court granted the government’s motion to Dismiss First Amendment Complaint.
This case is now back before the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in context of the
criminal case. Warshak’s criminal conviction (various fraud crimes) is on appeal on a variety of
issues, including the issue of whether the emails the government seized should have been
suppressed. This gives the Sixth Circuit an opportunity to rehear the Fourth Amendment issue
that had been decided and later vacated in the civil case. We signed onto EFF’s amicus brief on
the limited Fourth Amendment email seizure issue that was filed on June 11, 2008. The U.S.
attorney filed its appellee brief October 7, 2009. Warshak filed a motion for extension of his
brief on October 21, 2009, which was granted. Warshak’s reply brief was filed November 18,
2009. A date for oral argument will be set soon.
State of Ohio v. Antwaun Smith
FACTS: When Antwaun Smith was arrested during an apparent attempt to sell drugs to
an informant, police searched him and seized his cell phone. Under well-established
Fourth Amendment law, they had a perfect right to do that. Police then, without a
warrant and without any exigent circumstances that would have provided some legal
justification for a warrantless search, searched the record of calls in the phone and the
records of stored numbers. That search revealed that the number of the phone matched a
number given the police by the informant and that the informants home and cell phone
numbers were stored on the phone. That information was used against Smith at trial and
he was convicted. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the search
of the phone was constitutional. The Supreme Court of Ohio has agreed to review that
holding.
LEGAL THEORY: The Fourth Amendment would not permit a warrantless search of Smith’s paper address book under these circumstances. Cell phones contain far more, and often more personal, information and should receive at least the same degree of protection.
STATUS: Our amicus brief to the Ohio Supreme Court was filed April 13, 2009. The state’s
brief was filed June 2, and Smith’s reply brief was filed June 22, 2009. Oral argument was held
September 15, 2009. On December 15, 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled 4-3 in Smith’s
favor. The majority held that while a cell phone may be seized incident to arrest, police must get
a warrant to search the contents of the phone. This was the first state supreme court decision on
this matter, and only the 4th such decision in the nation. The state filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the Ohio Supreme Court denied on Feb. 10, 2010. The state has 90 days
to decide if it will petition for cert to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Criminal Justice
Hasan v. Ishee
FACTS: Siddique Hasan was convicted for his alleged role in the murder of prison guard William Vallandingham during the Lucasville prison riot in 1993. In April 2003, Hasan filed for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in U.S. District Court. As part of that litigation, his attorneys filed a Motion to Conduct Discovery and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on January 8, 2004. On June 14, 2004, U.S. District Court Magistrate Merz issued a Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion for Discovery and Denying Without Prejudice the Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.
LEGAL THEORY: Hasan, in fact, was not the killer, a contention supported by testimony in trials of other Lucasville defendants, by at least eight witnesses, and various affidavits. In addition, the sole evidence linking Hasan to the murder is testimony by another inmate who has since recanted.
STATUS: We are amicus on this federal habeas case. Our Motion for Leave to File an
Amicus Brief in Support of Hasan’s Objections to Magistrate’s Recommendations was
filed on October 11, 2006. On October 24, 2006, that Motion was granted. On March 28,
2007, we filed an additional motion alleging error for failure to give effect to mitigation,
and to weigh new mitigation excluded from being presented. On April 02, 2007, the Ohio
Attorney General was granted leave to respond to the additional authority and on April
10, 2007 filed their response.
City of Toledo v. Rost (Sex Offender Residency Restrictions (SB 5))
FACTS: Persons adjudicated Sexually Oriented Offenders, Habitual Sexual Offenders, and Sexual Predators are forbidden from residing within 1000 feet of a school. They are also required to register their address with the county sheriff. Effective April 29, 2005, a prosecutor may file an action to evict a sex offender from a residence within 1,000 feet of a school.
LEGAL THEORY: The case raises issues of substantive and procedural due process and of the right against self-incrimination.
STATUS: The judge heard arguments on a motion to dismiss on August 8, 2007 and later
denied that motion. After the judge denied the motion to dismiss because the law was
unconstitutional, Rost entered a no contest plea and was found guilty. On June 3, 2008, Rost was
placed on probation and ordered to pay court costs. Notice of Appeal was filed on June 3, 2008.
Our brief was filed May 18, 2009. The state’s brief was filed July 10, and our reply was filed
July 28, 2009.
Adam Walsh Act (SB 10) Sex Offender Registration and Notification Cases
FACTS: Ohio’s old system of sex offender classification, determining whether or not and how often convicted sex offenders must report to local law enforcement, was far from perfect but did rely in large part on how likely an offender was to re-offend. Such laws were challenged in the past because of their punitive nature and their retroactivity. However, those challenges have been largely unsuccessful. Ohio, as many other states soon will, adopted a state version of the federal Adam Walsh Act at the urging of the federal government. The new law scrapped Ohio’s old classification system and replaced it with a stricter system that does not take into account offenders’ likelihood to re-offend and applies even to offenders whose reporting requirements ended before passage of the new law. We are litigating a number of cases arising under the act.
The Ohio Supreme Court has accepted three test cases on the Adam Walsh Act –
State v. Bodyke (regarding the act as a whole), In re D.S.
(regarding the act’s application to juveniles), and Chojnacki v. Cordray (whether there is a right to appointed counsel for challenging reclassification under the act) – that have been briefed and argued and are awaiting decision. The Court has accepted a number of other Adam Walsh Act cases and stayed them pending decision in the three cases above. Details on these three cases can be found below. Once the Court rules on those cases, we will have a better idea of whether and how the Adam Walsh Act can be applied in individual cases, if at all. Unfortunately, that leaves many people’s cases in limbo until the Court rules.
State v. Bodyke
LEGAL THEORY: This comprehensive challenge to Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act is a
direct appeal of the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ decision of three cases which were
consolidated.
STATUS: Our brief in the District Court of Appeals was filed March 17, 2008; the State’s brief was filed April 21; our reply brief was filed May 2. On August 25, 2008 oral arguments were held in the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District. On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas. On December 31, 2008, we filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction to the Ohio Supreme Court. An amended notice of appeal was filed on Jan. 16, 2009. On April 8, 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court granted the appeal and will be hearing this case together with
in re D.S. Our merit brief, along with several amici in support, was filed July 13, 2009. The state’s appellee brief, along with amici in support from the attorney general and prosecutors, was filed on September 1, 2009. Our reply brief was filed September 21, 2009. Oral argument was held November 4, 2009.
On June 3, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the sections of the Adam Walsh Act that required the Attorney General to reclassify offenders who had been classified by the courts under the prior law (Megan’s Law) violates the separation of powers doctrine and is unconstitutional. To remedy this violation, the Court struck those sections of the Adam Walsh Act, held that the reclassifications by the Attorney General are invalid, and reinstated the prior Megan’s Law classifications that had been imposed by the courts.
The Court’s decision is available here:
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-2424.pdf
State v. Nelson
LEGAL THEORY: The Common Pleas Court in Stark County consolidated a large number of cases raising among them comprehensive challenges to the Adam Walsh Act.
STATUS: We are amicus in this case. Our brief was filed January 31, 2008.
In re D.S.
LEGAL THEORY: In January 2005, D.S. was adjudicated delinquent for three counts
of rape and committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services. In August 2007, D.S.
was classified as a Tier III juvenile sex offender registrant under S.B. 10, Ohio’s newly
enacted version of the Federal Adam Walsh Act. He appealed his classification to the
Third District Court of Appeals, which affirmed D.S.’s classification.
STATUS: The Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear D.S.’s appeal. Along with issues of
retroactivity, one of the questions the court will have the opportunity to address in this case is the
discretion of juvenile court judges to determine classification. If the judges have sufficient
discretion, then that changes the entire dynamic of the law, rendering many of its provisions
constitutional. In the case In re G.E.S., the Ninth District Court of Appeals, held that juvenile
judges have that jurisdiction. We are amicus in support of D.S. addressing the judicial discretion
issue. The amicus brief was filed in the Ohio Supreme Court March 3, 2009. On April 8, 2009,
the Ohio Supreme Court said oral argument will be held on the same day as Bodyke. Oral
argument was held November 4, 2009. We await a decision.
Chojnacki v. Cordray
LEGAL THEORY: Whether someone has a right to appointed counsel in a
reclassification hearing under the Adam Walsh Act.
STATUS: This case was initially accepted by the Ohio Supreme Court based on a certified
conflict between appellate districts on whether the denial of a request for appointment of counsel
in a reclassification hearing pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act is a final appealable order. The
Ohio Supreme Court accepted the case on August 6, 2008. The case was fully briefed, and oral
argument was held March 11, 2009. On March 23, 2009, the Court ordered additional briefing
on 2 questions: (1) whether AWA sex offender reclassification hearings are civil or criminal
proceedings, and (2) whether sex offenders are entitled to the appointment of counsel for
reclassification hearings if those proceedings are civil. On May 4, 2009, we filed an amicus brief
in support of Chojnacki on these issues, together with five county public defender offices. On
June 3, 2009, the Court granted the parties’ April 17, 2009, motion to hold oral argument on the
same day as Bodkye and In re D.S. Oral argument was held November 4, 2009. We await a
decision.
HABEAS PETITION
Foust v. Hauk
FACTS: Kelly Foust is on death
row in Ohio after being found guilty in 2002 of committing Aggravated
Murder, Attempted Murder, Rape, Aggravated Arson, and other offenses.
His case went through the available paths in Ohio courts to no avail.
LEGAL THEORY: Foust is entitled to a
full round of review in the federal courts of all federal constitutional
issues properly raised in the Ohio courts. The process is by
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
STATUS: The petition was filed March
22, 2007. The State of Ohio filed its response on May 21, 2007. Our
traverse was filed October 5, 2007. Discovery will be underway soon if
the court grants permission. We filed a motion to conduct discovery on
November 12, 2007. The State filed a memo-opposing discovery on November
19, 2007. On January 15, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio issued an Opinion and Order denying our motions to
conduct discovery and for allocation of funds for experts. On August 15,
2008 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued an
Opinion and Order denying our petition for habeas corpus and dismissed the case also issuing a blanket denial of a Certificate of
Appealability. Our notice of appeal was timely filed. Our motion for a Certificate of
Appealability was filed in the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on October 29, 2008. On
November 21, 2008, the State of Ohio filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner
Appellant’s request for a certificate of Appealability. On December 09, 2008, we filed our Reply
to Warden’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Certificate of Appealability. On September
21, 2009, the Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability.
Border Detentions
Rahman v. Chertoff
FACTS: As a consequence of post 9-11 policies, perhaps thousands of law-abiding citizens and their families are repeatedly subject to unwarranted, protracted, and highly punitive detentions whenever they reenter the United States from other countries. The border detentions include body searches, handcuffing, seizure of personal and business records, brandished handguns by authorities and other excess. The victims of these detentions are predominantly Muslim and/or of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent. They are erroneously listed – or wrongly identified as being listed – on the government’s Terrorist Screening Database, and they have no meaningful way of either determining their status or challenging it.
LEGAL THEORY: These detentions, and their underlying policies, violate due process and the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. This is a class action on behalf of two plaintiff classes: (1) U.S. citizens subject to unreasonable detention and treatment because they are wrongly classified or misidentified; (2) their family members who are unreasonably detained along with them.
STATUS: This case was brought in 2005 by the ACLU of Illinois. On April 23, 2008, plaintiffs
asked for leave to file a third amended complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois and to add 6 additional plaintiffs including three from Ohio (one our former
Board members Ahmad Al-Akhras). On May 13, 2008, the case was brought before the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 26, 2008, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court’s decision to certify class status and remanded the case. On June 3, 2009, the
district court sua sponte reconsidered its June 2007 decision to deny the government’s motion to
dismiss. The court also struck all pending motions, including our motion to intervene. On June
16, 2009, we filed a new motion to amend the complaint and add the six plaintiffs. On June 17,
2009, it was denied. On July 17, 2009, the US government filed a new motion to dismiss. Our
response was filed September 21, and the government’s reply was filed September 25, 2009.
Our side requested permission to file a surreply and was denied. We await a decision on the
motion to dismiss.
DUE PROCESS
Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Paulson
FACTS: Kindhearts is a Toledo-based charity that funds day care and the like in Israel and Palestine. In early 2006, the federal government froze its assets while it investigated whether to charge it with support of terrorists (Hamas). Kindhearts has been, effectively, shut down all this time with no real opportunity to demonstrate that the charges against it are bogus.
LEGAL THEORY: Our lawsuit argues that the government’s action violates Kindhearts’ rights to due process to address the charges. The extraordinary time that this has taken has done irreparable damage to the reputation and interests of the charity and left the charity and its people under a horrible cloud of mistrust and fear.
STATUS: A groundbreaking lawsuit was filed on October 9, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio. On that day, the judge granted a temporary restraining order
against the government to prevent it from taking further action in the short term so that litigation
could be pursued. After discussion with the Justice Department, we agreed to vacating the
restraining order and to an expedited briefing schedule. Our motion for summary judgment was
filed November 21, 2008, the government’s opposition and its own motion for summary
judgment was filed December 12. Our reply in support of our motion and opposition to theirs is
due January 16, 2009, and the government’s reply is due February 6, 2009. A status conference
was held on March 24, 2009. Oral argument was held before Judge Carr on May 1, 2009. On
August 18, 2009, the court ruled on the government’s motion to dismiss and our motion for
partial summary judgment, granting each in part. The court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss with regard to our claims that the Fourth Amendment precludes final designation of a
charity as a terrorist organization, the authority of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is void for vagueness, and several of our due process claims.
However, the court granted several of the claims made in our motion for partial summary
judgment. Specifically, the court ruled that the government cannot freeze an organization's assets
under a terror financing law without obtaining a warrant based upon probable cause (Fourth
Amendment violation). The court also found that the government must give the organization
notice of the basis for freezing its assets and a meaningful opportunity to defend itself (due
process violation). The court set a status conference for September 21, 2009, to schedule briefing
and argument on the remaining issues. Also on September 21, 2009, we filed a motion for
interim relief or a temporary restraining order, seeking relief for the constitutional violations the
court found in granting us partial summary judgment on August 18, 2009. Defendants' brief in
opposition to interim relief was filed 10/2/09, and our reply was filed 10/9/09. A status
conference was held 10/13/09. On 10/15/09, the court held telephonic oral argument on the
motion for interim relief. Following the argument, the plaintiffs were to submit a proposed order
and the defense was given leave to respond. On 10/26/09, the court granted a TRO restraining
the government from classifying Kindhearts as a SDGT (Specially Designated Global Terrorist
organization) and basically staying the designation process pending a final determination of
remedy for the constitutional violations found by the court in August 2009. The court reset the
briefing schedule on the issue of what the final remedy should be. The court reset the
briefing schedule on the issue of what the final remedy should be. In response to that, plaintiffs
filed our brief 10/30/09, defendants response was filed 12/7/2009; plaintiffs reply was filed
12/21/2009; and defendants sur-reply was filed 1/11/2010.
State v. Maxwell White
FACTS: White was convicted and sentenced to death for a crime that occurred in January
1996. The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found sentencing phase errors, reversed his
sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. On remand to the state court for re-sentencing,
the issue was raised as to whether White could be re-sentenced to death under the current
statute or whether the court could only apply the re-sentencing options provided by statute
at the time of White’s 1996 crime, under which a person could not be sentenced to death
again at re-sentencing.
White's counsel filed a motion in the trial court to prohibit re-sentencing of death on the
grounds that it violates the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court
agreed. The state appealed, and the appeals court reversed. White appealed, and the Ohio
Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction.
LEGAL THEORY: At the time of White’s offense, he could not be re-sentenced to death.
Under the current statute, he can. This constitutes a retroactive increase in punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, it imposes new and
additional burdens, and it takes away or impairs a vested right in violation of the
Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.
STATUS: The Ohio Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction on Dec. 2, 2009. White’s merit
brief and OACDL’s amicus in support were filed Feb. 16 (a day early), and our amicus in
support was filed Feb. 17, 2010. The Ohio Attorney General filed an amicus in support of
the state appellee on March 11, 2010. The state appellee’s merit brief is due March 18,
2010. White’s reply is due April 7, 2010.
John Doe v. Mary Ronan, Cincinnati Public Schools, and Ohio Department of
Education
FACTS: State law requires all public school employees to undergo a criminal background
check. Prior to 2007, background checks were only required for school employees who had
direct care or custody of schoolchildren. In 2007, the General Assembly amended the law to
require background checks for all current school employees and applicants, regardless of
whether or not they have direct care of schoolchildren. One of two things happen to
employees whose background checks reveal a criminal record. Most are given an
opportunity to prove they are rehabilitated and should still be eligible for employment.
However, the new law included a list of past offenses where the employee would not be
allowed to prove rehabilitation and would just be summarily terminated.
Nearly all of the offenses that permanently banned one from employment were offenses of
violence, sexually oriented offenses, offenses against children, theft offenses, or other
crimes that victimized people. Yet, drug offenses – non-violent and often victimless – were
also included in the list of offenses for which one would be forever banned from any
employment. Arbitrarily, this law created an irrebutable presumption that people with
drug offenses cannot be rehabilitated.
John Doe had been a good employee of the Cincinnati Public Schools for twelve years, as a
Safe and Drug Free School Specialist and was later promoted to be a Due Process Hearing
Specialist. He did not have direct supervision of students, so he was not required to
undergo a background check until the 2007 law was adopted. A background check
revealed that John Doe had a single drug conviction in 1976. The result was that Doe’s
employment was automatically terminated, without any chance to prove rehabilitation,
despite the fact that he had been a model employee for over a decade.
LEGAL THEORY: The Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution prohibits retroactive
application of a law that infringes on substantive rights. The law at issue here infringed on
Doe’s substantive rights by divesting him of his employment without due process. Several
other states have found similar automatic employment bans to infringe on due process.
Thus, the law that divested Doe of his employment without due process violated his rights
under the Retroactivity Clause.
STATUS: In April 2009, Doe filed suit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.
CPS and Ronan removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio. In November 2009, the District Court granted Doe’s request and issued an order
certifying state law questions to the Ohio Supreme Court and staying proceedings pending
resolution of the state questions. On Jan. 17, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear
both certified questions. The two questions presented to the Ohio Supreme Court are
whether the 2007 law that led to Doe’s automatic termination violated his rights under the
Retroactivity Clause and the Contract Clause of the Ohio Constitution. John Doe’s merit
brief was filed March 8, 2010. Also on March 8, we filed an amicus brief in support of Doe
arguing that his termination without due process violated his rights under the Retroactivity
Clause. The Ohio Employment Lawyers Association, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, and Towards Employment filed an amicus in support of Doe under the Contract Clause. The
defendants’ brief is due April 7, and Doe’s reply is due April 27, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Darryl Durr (Durr I)
FACTS: Ohio law allows inmates to petition for post-conviction DNA testing. If the petition is denied, the inmate may appeal. A non-death row inmate has an automatic right to appeal to the intermediate appeals court. However, a death row inmate, who arguably has much more at stake, has no automatic right to appeal. Death row inmate Darryl Durr petitioned for post-conviction DNA testing. His petition was granted in part and denied in part by the trial court. The testing of evidence that was granted turned out to be inconclusive, making the denial of testing other evidence all the more needed. There is no right to appeal, the intermediate appeals court has a habit of dismissing such requests for appeal, and Durr has a scheduled execution date. Thus, Durr’s lawyers are appealing directly to the Ohio Supreme Court, on both the denial of additional DNA testing and also arguing that he should have the same right to appeal as other inmates.
LEGAL THEORY: There is a clear civil liberties concern about lack of due process and equal protection in not allowing death row inmates to appeal a denial of post conviction DNA testing while non-death row inmates are allowed an appeal of right.
STATUS: Durr filed his notice of appeal and memorandum in support of jurisdiction on November 20, 2009. We filed our amicus brief on that same date. The state filed its memorandum in response on December 8, 2009. Durr is currently scheduled for execution on April 20, 2010.
On April 5, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction.
Darryl Durr v Richard Cordray, et al. (Durr II)
FACTS: (See above under Durr I for background.) In light of the Ohio Supreme Court declining to accept jurisdiction, Durr was denied any appeals court review of the denial of DNA testing. Durr is currently scheduled for execution on April 20, 2010.
LEGAL THEORY: There is a clear civil liberties concern about lack of due process and equal protection in not allowing death row inmates to appeal a denial of post conviction DNA testing while non-death row inmates are allowed an appeal of right.
STATUS: On behalf of Durr, we filed a federal civil rights lawsuit on April 13, 2010, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The lawsuit seeks: (1) to have the disparity between death row and non-death inmates’ right to appeal declared unconstitutional, (2) the additional DNA testing of evidence that was denied Durr, and (3) an order staying Durr’s April 20, 2010 execution until the lawsuit’s conclusion.
On April 13, 2010, the district court issued an expedited scheduling order. On April 14, the Ohio Innocence Project filed an amicus brief in support of Durr’s claims. Also on April 14, the state and county defendants filed a motion to dismiss Durr’s suit. On April 15, the court held a hearing on Durr’s motion for a stay.
On April 16, 2010, the federal district court issued an order denying Durr’s request for a stay of execution. The court found that the case should not have been brought as a Section 1983 civil rights case, but instead found it should have been brought as a habeas action. The district court transferred the remaining habeas case to the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. Durr filed a notice of appeal regarding the court’s decision that his case could not proceed as a civil rights claim under Section 1983.
The appeal was immediately docketed in the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. The two appeals related to the habeas issue and the Section 1983 issue were consolidated by the court, and all briefs were ordered to be submitted on April 17, 2010. The state filed separate briefs on the habeas and Section 1983 issues, urging the 6th Circuit to affirm the district court’s decision. Durr filed a motion for a stay of execution pending appeal on both issues and urging reversal of the district court’s decision.
On April 18, 2010, the 6th Circuit issued its decision. The 6th Circuit reversed the district court and found that Durr’s claims could be brought as a Section 1983 civil rights suit. However, the court nonetheless denied Durr’s motion for a stay of execution.
On April 19, 2010, Durr filed a motion for stay of execution and a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, both of which were denied later that same day. Also on April 19, the governor denied clemency. Durr was executed April 20, 2010.
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
Miller v. Wilkinson
FACTS: This case is pending in district court on remand from the United States
Supreme Court where it was decided under the name of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709 (2005). The plaintiffs are prison inmates who are adherents of the Asatru
religion. (The Asatru religion is centered on the worship of pre-Christian Norse
gods (such as Thor and Tyr) that originated in Northern Europe.) The defendants
are Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) officials. Prior to
the filing of the lawsuit ODRC refused to recognize the religion or accommodate
any Asatru religious worship.
LEGAL THEORY: The pending issues in
Miller v. Wilkinson fall into two
categories: (1) the right of inmate adherents of the Asatru religion to individual
worship (in their cells), and (2) the right of those same inmates to group worship.
PUBLIC RECORDS
State ex rel. Brian Bardwell v. Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners
FACTS: Brian Bardwell is the director of a Cleveland area non-profit called Citizens for
Sunshine and often files requests under the Public Records Act. In early 2009, Bardwell
requested documents from the Cuyahoga County Commissioners pertaining to an ongoing
project. The Plain Dealer threatened to sue the county for the draft, and the newspaper and
county apparently reached an agreement whereby the drafts were disclosed. Mr. Bardwell,
however, was told that the draft agreements were protected by attorney-client privilege and
would not be released until an agreement was finalized. Mr. Bardwell filed a pro se action in the
8th District Court of Appeals asking for a writ of mandamus to compel the county to turn over the
documents. While Bardwell’s mandamus suit was pending, the county turned over the draft and
final agreements to him. The 8th District Court, in July 2009, denied the writ of mandamus as
being moot. However, the court also cast aspersions on Bardwell’s motives in filing the suit and
of its own volition ordered Bardwell to show cause why the court should not impose sanctions
for his filing the suit. On October 19, 2009, the 8th District Court issued a judgment against
Bardwell and ordered him to pay sanctions in excess of $1,000. While the court stopped short of
saying the case was frivolous, the court did go on at length about how the action wasted the
court’s and prosecutor’s time when Bardwell got all the records he was entitled to. The court also
scrutinized Bardwell’s prior mandamus filings as being a serial nuisance, even though many of
them had in fact been successful. The court then went on to warn Bardwell to exercise great
caution in filing future mandamus actions, as he could face even greater sanctions.
LEGAL THEORY:
The 8th District’s judgment imposing sanctions on Mr. Bardwell for having
filed numerous public records cases creates a dangerous precedent. There is nothing in the Public
Records Act limiting the number of public records requests or cases an individual may file, but
the court has implied one here. If this ruling were to be left intact, it could mean that any group
that often files public records requests and when needed sues to enforce them could face
sanctions for exercising what the Public Records Act allows them to do.
STATUS: On November 4, 2009, we filed a motion in the 8th District Court requesting a stay of
the sanctions judgment pending appeal. On Nov. 6, 2009, the county filed an opposition to the
stay. On Nov. 18, 2009, we received notice that the 8th District denied the stay.
On Nov. 24, 2009, we filed our notice of appeal and a motion for a stay pending appeal in
the Ohio Supreme Court. The case was immediately docketed as an appeal of right. On
December 1, 2009, the county filed an opposition to our stay motion. On Dec. 30, 2009, the
Court denied the stay motion. The record was filed Dec. 17, 2009. Our appeal brief was filed Jan.
26, 2010. The County’s brief was to be due on Feb. 25, but counsel agreed to an extension
so that the County’s brief is now due March 17, 2010. Our reply brief is due April 6, 2010.
State of Ohio ex rel. American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners et al.
FACTS: In November 2009, voters in Cuyahoga County passed ballot Issue 6, which created a charter for the county. Over the course of 2010 and into 2011, the county will transition from the old county government structure to the new charter government structure. The charter spells out how the transition is to happen: In early 2010 the current Board of County Commissions appointed three senior administration officials to a Transition Advisory Group (TAG) that is charged with developing recommendations for transitioning to the new charter government. Elections for the new charter offices will take place in fall 2010, and the new officials will take office in January 2011. The TAG is supposed to make recommendations to and work with the new officials.
The TAG has appointed a Transition Executive Committee and numerous sub-committees and workgroups to assist them in studying various government functions and making recommendations. Each committee is chaired by at least one county government official and at least one private community leader. The County transition officials have acknowledged that the TAG is a governmental body covered by the Public Records Act and Open Meetings Act. However, the County transition officials claim that the Transition Executive Committee, and all committees or workgroups under them, are purely volunteer advisory groups and not governmental bodies subject to the requirements of the public records or open meetings laws.
LEGAL THEORY:
We believe it creates a dangerous precedent for the government to claim a body is not public simply because some of the members are volunteers or the group only makes recommendations. Existing Ohio caselaw says that advisory committees and volunteer staffed committees are nonetheless public bodies subject to the Sunshine Laws. There is also caselaw that says the government may not create a shell private entity to hide from the Sunshine law requirements.
STATUS: We filed a complaint for writ of mandamus and supporting materials in the Ohio Supreme Court on April 27, 2010.
LGBT RIGHTS
Cleveland Taxpayers for the Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland (challenge
to domestic partner registry)
FACTS: The City of Cleveland passed legislation in December 2008 creating a domestic
partner registry. The registry officially opened in spring 2009. The registry is open to both
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, whether they reside within or outside of the City of
Cleveland. To apply, a couple must fill out a declaration of domestic partnership and pay a
$55 fee. The fee covers the cost of administering the registry, so that the City neither bears
a cost nor makes a profit. The registry does not convey any legal rights whatsoever,
although it may provide helpful documentation for couples to verify eligibility for some
private benefits.
In August 2009, the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) filed a lawsuit on behalf of a group of
Cleveland taxpayers challenging Cleveland’s domestic partner registry. They argued that it
violates two provisions of the Ohio Constitution – (1) that it violates the marriage
amendment by recognizing same-sex relationships, and (2) that it violates the home rule
provision. The City filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted on November 2, 2009. The
Common Pleas Court dismissed the case in a docket entry with no written opinion. ADF
filed their notice of appeal on December 1, 2009.
LEGAL THEORY: The registry does not run afoul of the state constitution. In 2005, the
8th District Court of Appeals in Cuyahoga County upheld the City of Cleveland Heights’
authority under home rule to create a domestic partner registry. The court said the
registry created no legal rights. Cleveland’s registry mirrors the one that was upheld in
Cleveland Heights. In 2007, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the marriage
amendment as limited to prevent the state from creating or recognizing a legal status
equivalent to marriage and conveying all of the rights and benefits of marriage. In that
case, the court found that the domestic violence statute at issue did not create any special or
additional relationship rights, it just identified the categories of people covered by the
statute. Likewise, Cleveland’s domestic partner registry creates no legal rights and
therefore does not violate the state constitution.
STATUS: The appellants filed their merit brief on Jan. 25, 2010. The City’s appellee brief
and our amicus in support were filed Feb. 16, 2010. The appellants filed their reply on
March 11, 2010.
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